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I. INTRODUCTION
State protectionism results in serious distortions of relative
pricing and makes it difficult for countries to compete in the inter-
national marketplace. During the second half of the 1980, most
Latin American countries, in recognition of this principle, progres-
sively implemented structural adjustment programs designed to
modify traditional trade restrictions. In fact, there is a clear, if rev-
olutionary, trend in the region to reconcile foreign trade policies so
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that domestic production may be maximized. Toward this end,
countries have drastically reduced tariff levels, privatized many in-
dustries, and attempted to properly manage exchange rates, all in
an effort to liberalize traditionally restrictive trade policies.
Latin American governments, seeking to abandon their tradi-
tional protectionist policies, face strong domestic opposition from
interest groups such as industry and labor. In fact, a number of
public officials in several Latin American countries were recently
elected because of their opposition to drastic adjustment measures.
The consolidation and permanence of the liberal programs depend,
to a large extent, on the international community's clear support of
liberal trade policies. Without this support, it will be extremely
difficult to garner the required political backing needed to main-
tain the liberalization efforts. These concerns reveal why the suc-
cess of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) is so vital to Latin America. A failure of the
Uruguay Round would deal a major political blow to liberal lead-
ers, eventually leading to increased protectionism.
The likelihood that Latin American nations will successfully
penetrate the international market depends on the stability and
predictability of the world economy. A strong world economy will
encourage the abolition of trade restrictions imposed on Latin
American imports, thus guaranteeing adequate access to foreign
markets.
Fortunately, Latin American leaders have received some much
needed support from the United States. In June 1990, President
Bush proposed the establishment of a hemispheric-wide free trade
zone in his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.1 Latin American
leaders have greeted the President's proposal enthusiastically. In
fact, a number of countries have already entered into bilateral
agreements with the United States. These agreements, which es-
tablish trade and investment commissions, are important because
they provide a foundation upon which further arrangements may
be made and a forum in which the parties may discuss such issues.
Further, Latin American integration groupings, such as the An-
dean Group 2 and MERCOSUR,3 have also expressed an interest in
1. Five Latin Ministers Embrace Free Trade, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1990, at A-16, col.
3. For a text of President Bush's statement, see President Bush's Address on "Enterprise
for the Americas" Proposal and Accompanying White House Fact Sheet, Released June
27, 1990 (Text), Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 125, at M-1 (June 28, 1990).
2. The Andean Group consists of Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. See
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establishing trade and investment agreements with the United
States.
The agendas for President Bush's Initiative and the Uruguay
Round address overlapping considerations. A balanced result in
the multilateral trade negotiations, including setting clear norms
for conducting international trade, would certainly facilitate the
establishment of free trade between the United States and Latin
American countries or groupings. It is important that the resulting
agreements take into account the needs and interests of all af-
fected parties; if they do not, complications will arise as each issue
will necessitate negotiations on a country-by-country basis. Thus,
any bilateral or regional agreements must be compatible with the
rights and obligations conferred upon the parties by the multilat-
eral agreements generated by the Uruguay Round.
The Uruguay Round constitutes the principal forum in which
to negotiate the conditions of market access. Its results will estab-
lish the general framework in which Latin American countries
must negotiate future trade agreements with the United States.
The impact of the Uruguay Round has particular significance for
the regional textile and garment trades, agricultural and tropical
products trades, and non-tariff barring.
This paper addresses two basic areas. Section II analyzes the
development of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during the past four years. This section
examines the difficulties confronted during the negotiating process
and the elements that must be addressed in future related discus-
sions. Section III analyzes the state of current negotiations and fo-
cuses on Latin American interests and positions.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
A. The Uruguay Round: Current Status
Trade ministers from over ninety-two countries met at the
Uruguayan resort of Punta del Este in September 1986, to launch
generally Much in Common, But Not All Will Help Bring Them Together, Latin Am.
Newsletter, Dec. 13, 1990, at 2.
3. MERCOSUR is the term used for the South American Common Market, also known
as the Southern Market, in which the regional giants such as Brazil and Argentina are the
dominant nations. See South American Countries Sign Common Market Treaty, Reuter
Lib. Rep., Mar. 28, 1991 (BC Cycle).
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a new round of global trade discussions. Initially proposed by the
United States and later supported by other industrialized nations,
the agreement to initiate a new round of negotiations took a full
week to craft. The GATT contracting parties drafted the Declara-
tion of Punta del Este, thus formally commencing the eighth round
of GATT negotiations.
The Uruguay Round enunciated four objectives: 1) to open in-
ternational trade by reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers; 2) to
strengthen the institutional capacity of GATT itself; 3) to expand
the range of GATT coverage to include such areas as textiles and
agriculture; and 4) to extend the scope of GATT to cover newly
emerging issues of international trade, such as services, trade-re-
lated aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs), and trade-re-
lated investment measures (TRIMs). The Uruguay Round partici-
pants created fifteen negotiating groups to discuss these issues.
The Uruguay Round is one of the most ambitious series of
global trade negotiations since World War I. 4 It is not surprising
that there have been many stumbling blocks during the negotia-
tions. The Uruguay Round represents a unique rule-making exer-
cise in that it embraces problems and solutions far more compli-
cated than those ever contemplated in earlier GATT negotiations.
The Round necessitates a profound revision of basic trade con-
cepts and definitions.
Conforming with the chronological framework established for
the Uruguay Round, the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC)
convened at Brussels on December 3, 1990, to conclude the trade
round. Unfortunately, the ministerial meeting collapsed and the
negotiating process broke down. The contracting parties tabled the
negotiations, and the participating trade ministers temporarily ad-
journed their four-year effort in order to reform the trading sys-
tem. Although the ministers adopted a final declaration, they
failed to sign any final agreements.
The collapse of the negotiations is generally attributed to an
impasse regarding agricultural considerations.5 However, a review
of the "Draft Final Act" reveals a lack of agreement in several ma-
4. One observer even suggested, "In the history not just of commerce, but of all areas of
international cooperation, there has almost certainly never been a negotiation as compli-
cated as the Uruguay Round." See Fin. Times, Dec. 8-9, 1990.
5. A New York Times article was especially harsh toward European resistance to mod-
ify farm policies. See The Europeans Sabotage Trade, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1990, at 24, col.
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jor areas of negotiation.' In fact, profound differences still exist in
several areas including textiles, services, Trade-Related Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPs), Trade-Related Investment Mea-
sures (TRIMs), subsidies and countervailing measures, safeguards,
dumping, and balance of payment restrictions per Article
XVIII(B). The delegates also failed to reach significant agreement
in the market access negotiations. They did, however, make some
progress toward clarifying certain GATT articles and Multilateral
Trade Negotiations agreements and arrangements.
Currently, the state of negotiations is uncertain. Although one
can consider the Brussels meeting a complete failure because of
the ministers' inability to reach an agreement, they did indicate
that they intended to table the discussions merely to provide for a
short "cooling off" period. The ministers demonstrated their com-
mitment to free trade and their desire to sustain the Uruguay
Round by designating Geneva as the locale for future negotiations.
They instructed the Secretary General of GATT to determine pos-
sible avenues of consensus so that negotiations could resume. The
ministers also agreed to base future negotiations on the "Draft Fi-
nal Act," which insures that the interests of participants are not
compromised by any agreements or offers made during the TNC
meeting in Brussels.
Some progress has been made since the Brussels meeting. At
the request of Minister Gros Spiel, Chairman of the TNC at the
ministerial level, GATT Director General Arthur Dunkel con-
ducted consultations with the major trading partners in an effort
to resolve differences in all major areas of disagreement. Further,
at the insistence of the Director General, the TNC convened a for-
mal meeting to keep the Third World delegates informed and to
explain the consultations.
The first two months of 1991 were intense. The Director Gen-
eral established a process involving bilateral and plurilateral con-
sultations. This process was primarily aimed at producing a "plat-
form" for future negotiations in agriculture.' However, it was also
designed to provide the impetus for resuming negotiations in all
other areas of concern as well. During this period, bilateral negoti-
ations were held between the United States and the European
6. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/35/REv. 1, Dec. 3, 1990.
7. South-North Development Monitor, No. 2537, Feb. 5, 1991.
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Community (EC). Discussions over agriculture with Cairns Group
members also took place. Additionally, the EC met during January
28-29, 1991, with ministers from six Latin American countries -
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay - all of
whom, with the exception of Mexico, are members of the Cairns
Group. At the meeting, the EC emphasized the importance of a
multilateral trading system, and suggested that the six countries
curtail some of their more ambitious desires in an effort to save the
negotiations.
Despite the praiseworthy efforts of all of the parties, a basic
platform on agriculture was not produced. Consequently, serious
negotiations and a restart of the Uruguay Round were simply not
possible. It became clear that the negotiations would not be con-
cluded by the beginning of 1991 as originally planned. The Secre-
tary General therefore determined that a new strategy must be im-
plemented in order to avoid a complete collapse of the negotiations
process. Thus, he convened meetings in late February to discuss
the possibility of resuming the Round with the major participants,
inviting only those delegations that had contributed in particular
areas to participate at the meetings.
At the meetings, the Secretary General filed a report on the
findings gleaned from the consultation process. None of the coun-
tries were permitted to make presentations, nor debate any issues.
Finally, the TNC met on February 26, at which time the Director
General stated, "My consultations have led me to conclude that I
have now at hand all the elements necessary to enable us to put
the negotiations back on track." He then proposed a work agenda.
Even though the committee concurred with the Director's assess-
ment and officially resumed negotiating, it failed to establish any
chronological framework for the Round.
Despite the progress made over the past year, future prospects
for agreement remain uncertain. Although participants express a
"cautious optimism," no significant progress has been made during
this time period. In fact, crucial negotiating groups have failed to
make any substantial progress since the midterm review, con-
ducted in Montreal in December 1988.8
The prospects for success in the Uruguay Round remain un-
8. The work program proposed by the Secretary General for the second stage of the
negotiations addresses basically the same issues that have been unresolved since the Mon-
treal meeting. See MTN.TNC/W/69, Feb. 26, 1991.
[Vol. 22:2-3
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certain. In an attempt to achieve a consensus on crucial underlying
issues, negotiations are continuing on a technical level. Yet, the
real prospects for success depend on important political decisions
that must be made by the major trading partners.
Short-term prospects for success depend on two fundamental
factors. First, the EC must clearly demonstrate that it intends to
negotiate seriously with respect to liberalizing international agri-
cultural trade. Absent evidence of such an intention, it would be
extremely difficult to maintain or accelerate the pace of the overall
negotiating process and guarantee a real compromise on other is-
sues. Unfortunately, the EC continues to send very ambiguous sig-
nals. Second, the United States Congress must extend the "fast
track" authority of the American executive so that the President
can negotiate more freely. In the absence of a clear mandate, nego-
tiations will not be seriously considered by most of the partici-
pants. In fact, it is unlikely that the participants will engage in any
substantive negotiations until a mandate is provided.
B. Obstacles to a Successful Completion of the Uruguay
Round
The Uruguay Round is substantively different from previous
trade rounds. Technological innovations in the productive
processes and international transactions, the inadequacy of ex-
isting legal and institutional arrangements, and the change in the
relative positioning of major trading partners to international la-
bor, present new challenges to fiscal management systems.9 Thus,
one important objective of the Round is to improve production and
trade mechanisms in order to reinforce multilateral norms and dis-
ciplines. Unfortunately, this objective has complicated the Round
because many of the proposals infringe upon national sovereignty
substantially more than those discussed in previous rounds.
The Uruguay Round was plagued with difficulties even before
it began. For the first time in GATT history, the ministers lacked
the consensus required to launch the trade round when they met.
The ministers initiated the negotiations only after they reached a
last-minute agreement for the liberalization of services and trade.
9. Abugattas, World Economic Restructuring and Multilateral Trade Negotiations:
The New Issues in the Uruguay Round Problems and Prospects for Latin America (paper
presented at the XIVth World Congress of the International Political Science Association,
Washington, D.C., Aug. 28 - Sept. 1, 1988).
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Problems mounted despite this effort. The ministerial meeting for
the midterm review of the negotiations, held in Montreal in De-
cember 1988, was eventually suspended. No substantive progress
was made until April 1989, when the TNC adopted a very loose
declaration at a meeting in Geneva.
The TNC meeting of July 23-28, 1990, was expected to gener-
ate basic agreements in the different negotiating groups and pro-
vide the impetus allowing for final agreements to be signed in
Brussels. Once again, the participants were unable to produce any
major agreements. Likewise, the meeting scheduled for November
12, 1990, which was to evaluate the negotiations according to the
provisions of Section G of the Punta del Este Declaration, was
cancelled.10
Unless major policy shifts occur, and absent substantial politi-
cal concessions, even the Brussels meeting is now in jeopardy.1 ' A
contingency of several groups of countries advised the Secretary
General to delay the TNC meeting at the ministerial level until
there was some basis of agreement on the more conflictive issues.
Nevertheless, he convened a meeting in December 1990, which, un-
fortunately, met with utter failure.
The complexity of the issues which have arisen during the ne-
gotiating process is compounded by the delicate interlacing be-
tween them and the short time frame available for decision- mak-
ing. These difficulties must be confronted in the post-Brussels
stage. Still, the Punta del Este Declaration is a carefully drafted
document which expresses the delicate balance of interests
achieved during the negotiating process. Although the Declaration
is not the equivalent of a comprehensive and binding agreement, it
does provide an impetus for further negotiation and development.
Several proposals have significantly impacted the development
of the Uruguay Round. These proposals have affected the Round
in the following ways: 1) in opposition to the stated objectives of
TRIP and TRIM proposals, Latin American countries have fore-
stalled the negotiating process; 2) developed countries are making
10. Brazilian Ambassador Rubens Ricuepero explained, "[i]n the current state of affairs
it is clearly impossible to carry out a detailed assessment of the progress in relation to spe-
cial and differential treatment for developing countries in the negotiations." See FOCUS,
No. 76, Nov. 1990.
11. In mid-November the Secretary General of GATT and the Chairman of the TNC at
the official level stated, "Some major political decisions are urgent and essential and it is not
an exaggeration to say that the Brussels meeting is now in jeopardy." See Id.
[Vol. 22:2-3
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a concerted effort to curtail the special and differential treatment
generally given to developing countries under GATT (Part IV); 12
and 3) although the Punta del Este Declaration mandates the de-
velopment of balanced agreements, current negotiations are
asymmetric.'s
Latin American and Caribbean countries formulated a joint
declaration in July 1990, which was drawn from the fifth Coordina-
tion Meeting of SELA. They stated that "[t]he results of the nego-
tiations in the Uruguay Round will only be acceptable for the
Latin American and Caribbean countries if they respond to the
specific mandates of the Punta del Este Declaration," and "[tihe
region will resist any attempt to redefine or to extend the princi-
ples agreed to for the conduct of the negotiations."" The majority
of developing countries support this position and demand adher-
ence to the Punta del Este Declaration. Prospects for success
seemingly depend on the developed countries fulfilling this
condition.
The evolution of the negotiations reflects the difficulties that
the participants have faced in their quest to reconcile the existing
trade regime with the new world realities. The difficulties encoun-
tered during the Uruguay Round have been particularly exacer-
bated by the absence of hegemonic leadership. In contrast to the
early post World War II period, in which progressive liberalization
of world trade and the establishment and maintenance of an inter-
national trade regime were possible under U.S. leadership, no
country currently has the capacity to impose its will and bring
about a conclusion to the negotiations. The Uruguay Round thus
presents a great challenge to the world community. Agreement
12. Although the Punta del Este Declaration clearly states that the developed countries
should not expect the developing countries to make contributions that are inconsistent with
their own development, financial, and trade needs, they are demanding reciprocity of negoti-
ated commitments. These demands are of particular concern in such areas as textiles, tropi-
cal products, and services.
13. Developed countries demand strong multilateral commitments with regard to ser-
vices, intellectual property, TRIMs, and TRIPs. Meanwhile, they have been unwilling to
compromise on issues of primary importance to developing countries (e.g., agriculture, tex-
tiles, natural resource-based products, market access negotiations). Thus, it is unlikely that
the developing countries will be flexible in meeting their demands. Furthermore, because
the contracting parties previously agreed to treat the various negotiations as a single under-
taking, the possible imbalance in current negotiations could make it difficult to embrace any
resulting agreements.
14. SELA, Declaraci6n de los Pases de America Latina y el Caribe sobre las Negocia-
ciones de la Ronda Uruguay, July 17, 1990.
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may be reached only through a meaningful cooperative effort. Suc-
cess will only be attained if there is a significant change in the
attitudes and behavior of major participants. The participation of
developing countries must be encouraged and embraced because
the Uruguay Round may only be concluded if the developing coun-
tries participate fully.
In Brussels, the major trading partners attempted to resolve
several important and outstanding issues through private consulta-
tions in the so called "green room" meetings. This practice pro-
duced an absolute lack of procedural transparency. Further, it de-
prived developing countries of their right to participate in the
negotiating process. The developing countries compounded their
mistake by later suggesting that the documents produced during
the meetings represented a consensus of all negotiators. This hy-
pocrisy did not go unnoticed. The developing countries lambasted
the President of the TNC during the midterm review. The Chilean
delegate exclaimed, "In no other international forum [is there] so
much talk about transparency, and in no other one [have we] wit-
nessed a less transparent process in decision making. This fact is
one of the principal reasons that makes it difficult to reach agree-
ments." Unfortunately, the actions of the developed countries have
created an atmosphere of suspicion and discontent. In a joint
statement issued at the Brussels meeting, the developing countries
explained that "[tlheir preoccupation with the lack of trans-
parency of the negotiations [was] due, among other factors, to the
attempt to solve outstanding issues through bilateral consultations
among the major trading partners."
Secret negotiations represent only one of the stumbling blocks;
a failure to cooperate is another. During the Montreal meeting,
when it became apparent that the United States and Europe could
not reach an agricultural agreement, the developing countries suc-
cessfully disrupted the conference at Brussels by insisting that no
other agreements would be ratified until an agricultural agreement
was reached. This demand ultimately led to the collapse of
negotiations.
It is abundantly clear that Latin American countries are will-
ing to use their newfound power and must be included in the nego-
tiations. A comprehensive reformulation of the negotiating meth-
ods must be made. Full and adequate participation must be
guaranteed to all participants and decision making should be
based on a generalized consensus.
[Vol. 22:2-3
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C. Developments and Prospects of the Negotiations
Any evaluation of the Uruguay Round must recognize the
profound changes experienced by the international system since
the Round was launched. Since 1986, several major events and cir-
cumstances have greatly influenced the positions and priorities of
the major participants, including: 1) the end of the Cold War and
the opening of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, creating new
challenges and opportunities for the industrialized nations, espe-
cially the EC;15 2) the reunification of Germany which altered that
country's position on agricultural issues; 3) the economic recession
(which revived the protectionist sentiments of the major trading
partners);1 6 4) the continuing and unresolved debt crisis and the
processes of economic stabilization and structural adjustment poli-
cies of developing countries, which present enormous economic
hurdles; and 5) the Persian Gulf Crisis, which diverted the atten-
tion of the world's senior political leaders during a crucial stage of
multilateral trade negotiations.
The following section presents a brief assessment of the cur-
rent state of negotiations in the crucial negotiating groups. It pays
special attention to the interests and the position of the Latin
American countries. The discussion is divided into three subsec-
tions: Market Access, Normative Negotiations, and New Issues.
III. CURRENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS
A. Market Access
Tariff and non-tariff measures, tropical products, natural re-
source-based products, textiles, and agriculture represent the pri-
ority areas for the developing countries of Latin America. Unfortu-
nately, no promising negotiations have taken place.
1. Tariff Negotiations
The contracting parties agreed in Montreal that the tariff re-
ductions should be, at the very least, equivalent to those agreed
15. Correspondingly, these events have significantly reduced the leverage of the United
States in its bilateral negotiations with EC countries.
16. Such attitudes cast doubts about their political commitment to accept any final
agreement.
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upon during the Tokyo Round. This amounts to a reduction of at
least 30% of the 1986 tariff levels. Although there was a proposal
to apply a mathematical formula for reducing the tariff levels, the
discussions were narrowed to a series of offers and petitions. This
result may be partially explained by the refusal of the United
States to accept the formulaic approach. Because of the failure to
incorporate a formulaic approach, most participants resorted to bi-
laterally negotiating with their principal suppliers in an offer/peti-
tion process. Through this process, it is estimated that the parties
managed to reduce tariff levels a mere 15%.
The United States is the most important market for Latin
American exporters. In 1988, the United States imported $43 bil-
lion worth of goods, 74.4% of which were subjected to tariffs. The
initial tariff cuts offered by the United States, when taken as a
whole, represent approximately 27% of the weighted average,
which was close to the trade round's goal of 30%. These proposals,
however, are deceiving. Each individual prospective reduction is
dependent upon the product involved, and contingent upon each
country's promise of reciprocity. 17
The Latin American countries are dissatisfied with the propos-
als presented by the developed countries. Some of the offers, such
as those dealing with agricultural products, are conditional. Others
are of limited scope, and fail to address the problems of tariff pro-
gression and tariff peaks. These problems must be considered if
negotiations are to progress.
Most of the Latin American countries have made important
tariff reduction offers, and have even offered to bind their tariff
schedules. A number of countries have radically reduced their
tariff levels and eliminated all non-tariff barriers. Despite the pro-
visions of the Montreal Agreement, which calls for the recognition
of such actions, the major trading partners have neither acknowl-
edged nor shown appreciation for these efforts.
2. Tropical Products18
Tropical products represent only 3% of world trade. Even so,
17. SELA, Evaluaci6n sobre Ia Situaci6n de la Ronda Uruguay de Negociaciones
Comerciales Multilaterales Preparada por los Palses de America Latina y el Caribe al 23 de
Noviembre de 1990.
18. Data on this issue has been extracted from Uruguay Round Revised Offers of Tar-
iffs Concession on Tropical Products (as of July 1990) the Potential Trade Impact,
[Vol. 22:2-3
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they are economically significant to a large number of developing
countries, including most of Latin America. Tropical products have
been a priority during the Uruguay Round, and there were discus-
sions regarding market access offers even as early as the Montreal
meeting.
The offers tabled during the July 1990 round by the industri-
alized countries would have created an estimated $746 million in
additional trade. This represents a 3% increase in the value of im-
ports from 1986. Interestingly, developed countries would be the
principal beneficiaries of the increased trade, in that their exports
of processed tropical products would increase by $457 millon. De-
veloping countries would enjoy an increase of only 1.7%, or a net
gain of about $250 million. Ninety-five percent of this increase
would be attributable to an increase in market access to the EC.
Because coffee accounts for 75% of covered trade, the gains ob-
tained by the developing countries would still not compensate for
the losses generated by the collapse of the International Coffee
Agreement.
3. Natural Resource-Based Products
World trade in natural resource-based products generates
about $140 billion in annual revenues. Because natural resource-
based products are of particular concern to developing countries, a
separate negotiating group was established, whose objectives are
the elimination of trade barriers and the creation of a more pre-
dictable market.
Initially, negotiations were to cover nonferrous metals, for-
estry, and fisheries. The industrialized countries, however, de-
manded that the scope of the negotiations be expanded to include
energy products, domestic policies, access to resources, and more.
The United States called for negotiations on such broad topics as
dual pricing of natural resources, related export restrictions, local
processing requirements, subsidies, and certain government owner-
ship practices. As a result of the broadening of issues, the negotia-
tions collapsed, and the issues were subsumed by the negotiating
group on tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
UNCTAD, Aug. 1990.
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4. Textiles
The Declaration of Punta del Este requires that negotiations
in the area of textiles and clothing be aimed at formulating modal-
ities that would permit the eventual integration of this sector into
the GATT on the basis of strengthened GATT rules and disci-
plines, thereby also contributing to the objective of further liberali-
zation of trade. The implicit aim of the agreement is to rescind the
Multifiber Agreement (MFA).'9
The textile and clothing trade generates an estimated $180 bil-
lion in revenues per year. Due to the export potential of the Latin
American countries, and the difficulties they have encountered in
gaining access to the markets of developed countries, the textile
and clothing trade is of great importance to the region.
Because the textile and clothing trades are sensitive topics for
developed countries, the negotiators are far from producing a com-
prehensive agreement. Although the developing countries have al-
ready allowed the imposition of a special regime based entirely
upon the time needed to restructure the domestic industries of the
industrialized nations, the industrialized countries are demanding
yet another period of transition.20
The integration of the textile and clothing trade into GATT
would be achieved in three stages. First, a given percentage would
be integrated in each stage.21 Second, the developed countries de-
mand strong liberalizing commitments and other conditions before
they will dismantle the MFA.2 2 Third, the Latin American coun-
tries demand special treatment for developing countries that are
small exporters. This special treatment must account for base
levels of exports and differing growth rates. The Latin American
countries further demand that the developed countries agree to re-
duce their own tariff levels. Unfortunately, the developed countries
have been reluctant to cooperate. The United States, for example,
has offered to reduce a high average tariff of 18.4% by only 7%.
19. That agreement will subject textile and clothing importations to bilaterally negoti-
ated quotas for nearly thirty years.
20. In fact, industrialized countries are demanding another ten to fifteen years.
21. Some proposals call for 10% to be integrated initially, then 25% in the second stage
and finally 55% in the last.
22. The Latin American countries nonetheless maintain that this position is unaccept-
able because they refuse to give concessions to repudiate an agreement that is itself in dero-
gation of GATT.
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5. Agriculture
Agricultural trade liberalization is the most conflictive issue in
the Uruguay Round. This is explainable, in part, by the fact that
agricultural policies operate at a cost of $250 billion in the OECD
countries and distort international trade.
The aim of agricultural negotiations is to achieve greater liber-
alization of trade. This would be accomplished by bringing all mea-
sures affecting import access and export competition under
strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules. Thus
far, the emphasis has been on reducing border restrictions, internal
support measures, export subsidies, and sanitary and phytosani-
tary barriers and measures. Estimates regarding the liberalization
of agricultural trade suggest such a move would bring an additional
$50 billion of export income to the efficient agricultural producing
countries during the next decade alone. Unfortunately, the negoti-
ations have been at an impasse since the midterm review; the
United States and the Cairns Group are currently pitted against
the EC. This standoff presents a particular threat to the Uruguay
Round because the future of the Round depends on agreement in
this area.
The United States and the Cairns Group have tabled several
proposals for agricultural trade reform. They demand a 75% re-
duction in internal support measures, tariffing of all existing bor-
der measures (and their reduction by 75%), and a 90% reduction
in all export subsidies, all to be completed within ten years.
The EC, after much deliberation, produced an offer to reduce
the aggregate measures of support to the agricultural sector by
30% within ten years.2 3 The EC also introduced the concept of re-
balancing, a proposal under which the liberalization of trade poli-
cies for one product would be compensated by the development of
restrictive measures for others.2
The EC seems determined to adhere to its re-balancing theo-
ries. During the Brussels meeting, the EC, followed by Japan and
Korea, rejected a compromise solution presented by the president
of the negotiating group. The solution mandated a 30% reduction
23. See Plaine & Swindler, Status of the Uruguay Round GATT Negotiations, Bus.
LAw. UPDATE, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 11.
24. For example, re-balancing would only produce a 15% reduction of agricultural sup-
port from the 1986 levels.
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from the 1990 levels in the three areas of negotiation during a ten-
year period and discarded the re-balancing concept.
The liberalization of agricultural trade is of foremost impor-
tance to Latin American countries.2 Accordingly, Argentina, Bra-
zil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay have participated actively in the
Cairns Group.26 The Latin American countries are thus striving for
a quick and comprehensive liberalization of agricultural trade poli-
cies. In addition, they demand distinctive treatment for developing
countries during the transition period, thus allowing them greater
flexibility in applying domestic agricultural policies.
Some countries, particularly Peru and Jamaica, are active
members of the group of net food importers. The food importing
countries demand that the final agreement consider the negative
impact that world agricultural reform will have on their economies.
In response, they demand that corrective measures be undertaken
during the transition period. Prospective measures may include fi-
nancial assistance, concessional sales, food aid, and the implemen-
tation of agricultural development programs.
The efforts of the Secretary General to reach a basic platform
on agriculture have not produced any meaningful results. The EC
has reaffirmed its position, demanding that other participants
lower their expectations. At the February 20, 1991, meeting, Ar-
thur Dunkel stated, "My consultations confirm that participants
agree to conduct negotiations to achieve specific binding commit-
ments on each of the following areas: domestic support; market ac-
cess; export competition; and to reach an agreement on sanitary
and phytosanitary issues." He called for technical work to begin
immediately to facilitate these negotiations. Because no country
directly refuted the statement, their silence may be considered as a
tacit approval. Thus, this "agreement" may be viewed as a minor
advance; it may represent an EC desire to negotiate.
25. It is estimated that the liberalization of agricultural trade will raise the interna-
tional prices of basic food staples 10%-30% depending on the product.
26. In a joint declaration, the countries stated, "For the success of the Uruguay Round
and the consequent acceptance of the results of a final package, it is a required condition
that adequate results are achieved in this area that lead to a substantial liberalization of
trade." See Declaration of the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean at the Fifth
Latin American Consultation Meeting of Sela on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, MTN/TNC/W/22, July 23, 1990.
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B. Normative Areas
The delegates must resolve a number of normative issues in
order for the Uruguay Round to produce adequate and balanced
results. Two issues are of crucial importance for Latin America.
First, the Round must consider the issue of dumping, including the
ancillary issues of subsidies and countervailing measures. Second,
the Round must address the debt problems of developing
countries.
Although much discussion has taken place on dumping, subsi-
dies and countervailing measures, negotiations have yet to yield an
agreement. In fact, there was no draft text for the Brussels meet-
ing. Strong differences between the participants persist. For in-
stance, some countries demand that the practices and instruments
of some of the major trading partners be multilateralized. Other
participants focus on anti-dumping measures, calling for the devel-
opment of investigatory mechanisms and strict enforcement of the
rules.
Dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures are of partic-
ular interest to the Latin American countries because of the
proliferation of these measures and their potential abuse. Such
measures can be used to restrict legitimate trade flows, thus
amounting to a "new type of protectionism."
Also of importance to Latin America is the attempt by the de-
veloped countries to initiate negotiations aimed at limiting their
rights under Article XVIII(B), which allows them to adopt correc-
tive measures when confronting balance of payments difficulties.
Not surprisingly, the Latin American countries maintain that they
will not permit a modification of the balance of rights and obliga-
tions under the provision.
C. New Issues
The agenda of the Uruguay Round includes three new and
controversial issues: TRIPs, TRIMs, and services. Although these
issues are discussed in separate negotiating groups, they are closely
linked as structural parts of a single, albeit broad, global issue: the
redefinition of the domain of the nation-state at the world level,
and the corresponding creation and protection of competitive ad-
vantages. The developed countries seek the establishment of a
multilateral framework that includes all aspects of transnational
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activities and all relevant international transactions. It is this issue
and its corresponding sub-issues that most clearly reflect the
North-South confrontation.
1. Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
Technological innovations may provide certain nations with
comparative trade advantages. The economic management of
ideas, data information, and overall know-how has therefore be-
come an international business of strategic importance. Conse-
quently, the generation, access, and protection of knowledge have
emerged as concerns crucial to all nations.
The industrial countries have tabled proposals which would
have changed the system of intellectual property rights protection
in several fundamental ways. Under one series of proposals, the
current system, which is based on national jurisdiction and loose
international conventions, like the Berne Convention and the Uni-
versal Copyright Convention (UNESCO), would be replaced by an
effective multilateral agreement with wide participation. Proposals
include (a) the creation of border controls buoyed by effective pen-
alties against transgressions; (b) the development of national stan-
dards that safeguard property rights; (c) measures that ensure that
intellectual property rights regulations will not act as obstacles to
trade; and (d) the extension of international dispute settlement
procedures to provide effective sanctions. GATT is preferred to the
World Intellectual Property Organization because of its focus on
international trade and wide participation.
Under a second series of proposals, intellectual property rights
protection would be extended to new areas not adequately ad-
dressed by most national systems. The proposals for increased pro-
tection are of major concern for the technological leaders. Because
technological advances have outpaced the development of intellec-
tual property laws, high-tech products, such as software, semicon-
ductors, and biotechnology, are not effectively protected at the
world level. Other proposals would extend the duration of protec-
tion or mandate the stringent enforcement of intellectual property
rights on a domestic level.
The inclusion of TRIPs in GATT would have serious repercus-
sions for developing countries. Currently, individual countries de-
termine the degree of protection they will afford technological in-
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novations. The establishment of an international system for
intellectual property rights protection will force developing coun-
tries to follow international norms whose objectives may not coin-
cide with their national interests. The introduction of a new inter-
national system and the execution of those rights by the
technological leaders would mean the dismantling of those national
regulations designed to promote and protect domestic industry, an
industry whose technological capabilities are still at infancy. As a
result, endogenous technological development will be difficult for
developing countries. These countries will be forced into growing
technologically dependent on the industrial world. This depen-
dence will be compounded by the monopoly it fosters. The cost of
acquiring new technology under a monopolistic price setting would
impose a significant cost on the developing countries and widen
the international economic imbalances. The U.S. International
Trade Commission estimates that U.S. industry alone would re-
ceive $43 to $102 billion in additional income if intellectual prop-
erty rights were adequately enforced.
Although a draft text for the negotiation of TRIPs was pro-
duced for the Brussels meeting, no agreement has been reached on
any of the substantive issues, several of which are still outstanding.
First, there is much concern over "Gattability;" that is, copyright
decisions covering computer programs must be reached. Second,
patent law presents many important challenges. For example, deci-
sions must be reached with regard to patentable subject matter
and exclusion, the terms of protection, nonvoluntary licensing, and
government use. Third, issues revolving around procedural and en-
forcement mechanisms must be examined. Fourth, there is strong
resistance to the protection of undisclosed information and to the
extension of the protection afforded to layout designs of integrated
circuits. Nevertheless, TRIP negotiations have not progressed since
1987.
Regardless of what agreements are finally reached, one thing is
clear: developing countries will demand an adequate transition pe-
riod. They maintain that such a period is necessary to allow re-
structuring of their productive capabilities. Some countries have
even linked the proposed transition period with those agreed upon
for the agriculture and textiles trades.
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2. Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)
Developed countries would like to establish an international
investment regime. They argue that Third World restrictions on
local content, production, sales, exports, equity, and licensing re-
quirements, as well as exchange and remittance restrictions, distort
trade and, therefore, should be banned by GATT. A series of pro-
posals have been submitted, designed to curtail these restrictions.
These proposals would drastically alter the traditional relation-
ships, which are based on domestic legislation or, in some cases, on
bilateral negotiations with transnational corporations. Geneva
TRIM negotiations failed to yield an agreement or even a draft
text for the Brussels meeting. The developed countries, particu-
larly the United States and Japan, continue to demand the enact-
ment of general restriction prohibitions, a demand that has created
much turmoil.
The Latin American countries maintain that sanctions must
be doled out on a case-by-case basis. They argue that the objective
of the negotiations is to correct trade distortions produced by re-
strictive investment measures, and that each situation must be in-
dividually examined within this context. They therefore maintain
that GATT regulations are sufficient.
3. Services
Contrary to all reasonable expectations, much progress has
been made in the effort to liberalize the $600 billion per year ser-
vice trade. In fact, the negotiators presented a draft agreement
which might be acceptable to most of the participants. Agreement
is possible because negotiators recently resolved two important is-
sues. In a reversal of policy, the United States initially suggested
that it would only confer Most Favored Nation (MFN) status on a
conditional country-by-country basis. 27 However, the United States
later agreed to grant MFN status automatically in any service
agreement, provided that there was an accompanying package of
specific market-opening agreements.2 8 Additionally, there has been
major progress with regard to derogations; it was agreed that dero-
gations would be minimal and subject to revision. The United
States also determined that the initial derogations will include civil
27. Plaine & Swindler, supra note 23, at 12.
28. Id.
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aviation and maritime transport. Although other issues are pend-
ing, such as an agreement on financial services and the extent of
commitments which can be expected from developing countries,
agreement is likely because these issues can be resolved with a
minimum of political will.
D. Prospects for the Negotiations
It is difficult to predict the outcome of future efforts and nego-
tiations because of the very ambitious nature of the Uruguay
Round and the rapidly changing dynamics of international rela-
tions. Still, the possibilities may be categorized into four possible
scenarios.
In the first scenario, the Uruguay Round is deemed an utter
failure and the negotiating process is postponed. Two circum-
stances could prompt this situation. First, if the EC refuses to un-
dertake serious negotiations regarding the liberalization of world
agricultural trade, talks will undoubtedly be stalled. The Latin
American countries, among others, will not negotiate in the ab-
sence of clear and ambitious commitments to fundamental agricul-
tural reforms. After four years of unsuccessful negotiations, the pa-
tience of Latin American countries is wearing thin; a further delay
could prompt the final collapse of the Round. Second, a U.S. Con-
gressional refusal to extend President Bush's "fast-track" author-
ity would cast serious doubts about the feasibility of enacting any
final agreements and would reflect poorly upon the commitment of
the United States.
The collapse of negotiations would seriously undermine the in-
ternational trade regime and irretrievably weaken GATT. Such an
occurrence would be a mixed blessing for Latin American coun-
tries. Latin American agricultural exporters would suffer because
they would lose the opportunity to access new markets, while im-
porters would be forced to pay more for their food. Still, with the
exception of agriculture, the Latin American region has little to
gain from the Uruguay Round. Nevertheless, a collapse of the mul-
tilateral trading system would eliminate one of the few defense
mechanisms that Latin American countries may employ in their
bilateral trade relations with the United States.
A collapse of the Uruguay Round could lead to the establish-
ment of regional trading blocks. Already, many observers argue
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that GATT is obsolete.2 9 If the Round collapses, Latin American
willingness to accept U.S. terms for participation in the Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative would be enhanced. Still, despite the
general enthusiasm for the new U.S. initiative, a rapid regional em-
brace of a new trading block would not be assured. After all, many
Latin American countries have taken unilateral measures to
restructure their economies and reduce trade barriers under the
implicit assumption that the developed countries would reward
such efforts.
A collapse of the Uruguay Round would be politically devas-
tating. The failure of enterprise negotiations, especially those re-
garding TRIMs and TRIPs, would undermine the legitimacy of the
region's political leaders who are pushing for closer trade relations.
Still, as President Bush clearly indicated during his trip to South
America in 1990, hemispheric agreements could fill the void left by
the collapse of the Uruguay Round. In fact, because of the difficul-
ties encountered in the Uruguay Round, this second option may
provide the best opportunity for success.
In the second possible scenario, a minimum trade liberaliza-
tion package would be adopted. This scenario is likely to occur if
negotiators continue to face serious difficulties during the post-
Brussels stage. This minimalist agreement would necessarily reflect
a recognition that the objectives set for the Uruguay Round were
simply too ambitious.30 Under this scenario, the more conflicting
issues would probably not be addressed; settlement would occur in
the six or seven areas in which there is currently some basis for
consensus. Other issues would be left for a future round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations.
Unfortunately, this quick-fix scheme could seriously prejudice
the Latin American countries. Although they probably would have
to concede much ground on agricultural trade and in other areas of
primary interest, the developed countries would still expect them
to compromise on issues such as services and TRIPs.
In the third scenario, the Uruguay Round would be converted
into a permanent process of trade negotiations, in which the differ-
ent trade issues would be settled without the benefit of any partic-
29. See G. Hufbauer, Beyond GATT, FOREIGN POLICY, No. 77, at 64-76 (1989-90); see
also J. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990).
30. This kind of outcome was already prophesied by the EC during the discussions
previous to the restarting of the negotiations of late February, 1991. See South-North De-
velopment Monitor, No. 2532, Jan. 29, 1991.
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ular time schedules. This scenario, in which decisions would be
made on a periodic basis, would be possible because of an agree-
ment adopted at the TNC meeting of February 26, 1991.
This third scenario has some important shortcomings. First, it
would be impossible for any country to apply a cost-benefit frame-
work in evaluating the final results of a series of agreements. This
situation would certainly harden negotiating positions; each coun-
try would be forced to minimize the cost of its commitments on
every issue. Second, it would represent an important departure
from the Punta del Este Declaration. Under the Declaration, nego-
tiations are supposed to be considered as a single undertaking.
Third, the application of deferential treatment for developing
countries as mandated by the Punta del Este Declaration would be
virtually impossible to effectively evaluate.
In the fourth scenario, the United States Congress would yield
to the overwhelming popularity of President Bush, and approve
the extension of his "fast-track" authority. This scenario is highly
probable because of the increasing possibility that a free trade
agreement will be signed with Mexico, and because of the stagger-
ing popularity (and attendant political power) currently being en-
joyed by the President in the post-Gulf War period. The likelihood
of this extension could even be enhanced through concessions by
the Bush administration; although U.S. law provides for a two-year
extension, the administration might suggest that it use the proce-
dures for a shorter period of time. This probable outcome, without
any formal agreement by the TNC, would necessarily impose a
clear time framework for the conclusion of the post-Brussels stage
of the negotiations.
If the negotiations are to be successfully completed, countries
must negotiate pragmatically, realistically, transparently, and in
accordance with the clear mandates of the Punta del Este Declara-
tion. Although it is impossible to accurately predict the actual out-
come of the Uruguay Round, it is clear that negotiations must con-
tinue, and agreements must be signed.
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